In September 2025, Judge Amit Mehta issued the long-awaited remedies opinion in the United States v. Google search case, in which he had previously held that Google illegally maintained its monopoly in general search services. At the heart of that monopoly were Google’s multi-billion-dollar payments to distributors—Apple, Samsung, Mozilla, and others—to lock in Google Search as the default on nearly every mobile device and across much of the desktop browser market. Yet despite identifying these payments as the central anticompetitive conduct, Judge Mehta declined to ban them. Concerned about windfall profits to Google, harm to channel partners, and consumer disruption, he allowed Google to continue paying for default placement subject only to minimal restrictions. The result, by the court’s own acknowledgment, is a remedy that may leave in place the very forces that have made the search ecosystem “exceptionally resistant to change.” Liability has been established, but the conduct that produced it can continue largely unchecked.
The case is now on appeal, and the judge’s remedy opinion already contemplates the possibility of revisiting the idea of a payment ban. To meet that moment when it comes, this paper proposes a targeted adjustment to the remedy that we call “Pay for Half.” Rather than ban Google’s default-placement payments outright, the court should cap them. We recommend up to a 50% market share cap—Google may pay channel partners on no more than half of the devices in any product line—paired with a payment cap (equivalent to a 40% revenue share) that limits how much Google can pay per device and forecloses obvious circumvention. Finally, to prevent discriminatory market segmentation, the devices eligible for Google payments would be randomly assigned within product lines.
In all, Pay for Half creates an immediate distribution channel for competitors, including emerging AI-powered entrants, and it responds to the concerns Judge Mehta raised: channel partners retain meaningful payments, OEMs design the user experience for their customers, and Google itself continues to compete for distribution. But it does so while the remedy opens at least half of the market to rivals on day one—the competitive condition that Judge Mehta’s own liability findings require.
The case is now on appeal, and the judge’s remedy opinion already contemplates the possibility of revisiting the idea of a payment ban. To meet that moment when it comes, this paper proposes a targeted adjustment to the remedy that we call “Pay for Half.” Rather than ban Google’s default-placement payments outright, the court should cap them. We recommend up to a 50% market share cap—Google may pay channel partners on no more than half of the devices in any product line—paired with a payment cap (equivalent to a 40% revenue share) that limits how much Google can pay per device and forecloses obvious circumvention. Finally, to prevent discriminatory market segmentation, the devices eligible for Google payments would be randomly assigned within product lines.
In all, Pay for Half creates an immediate distribution channel for competitors, including emerging AI-powered entrants, and it responds to the concerns Judge Mehta raised: channel partners retain meaningful payments, OEMs design the user experience for their customers, and Google itself continues to compete for distribution. But it does so while the remedy opens at least half of the market to rivals on day one—the competitive condition that Judge Mehta’s own liability findings require.